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SUMMUM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Bernadette Meyler* 
Chief Justice Roberts: [T]he more you say that the monument is Gov-
ernment speech to get out of the first, free speech—the Free Speech Clause, 
the more it seems to me you‘re walking into a trap under the Establishment 
Clause.  If it‘s Government speech, it may not present a free speech prob-
lem, but what is the Government doing speaking—supporting the Ten 
Commandments? 
Justice Kennedy: [I]t does seem to me that if you say it‘s Government 
speech that in later cases, including the case of the existing monument, 
you‘re going to say it‘s Government speech and you have an Establishment 
Clause problem.  I don‘t know if—I‘m not saying it would necessarily be 
resolved one way or the other, but it certainly raises . . . an Establishment 
Clause problem. 
Justice Souter: But . . . [t]he Government isn‘t disclaiming [the Ten 
Commandments monument].  And the difference[,] it seems to me[,] be-
tween you and your friends on the other side is you want this clear state-
ment [that the city has adopted the monument].  You want a statement—for 
example if you took Justice Scalia‘s statement, that would satisfy you, and 
it would also be the poison pill in the Establishment Clause.  Isn‘t that 
what‘s—I mean, that‘s okay with me.  I don‘t see that as an illegitimate ob-





  Professor, Cornell University School of Law.  I am grateful to my colleagues Josh Chafetz and 
Steve Shiffrin for discussing the Summum case with me, as well as for the thoughtful comments of my 
co-panelists Joe Blocher, Chris Lund, and Nelson Tebbe on an earlier draft and the careful work of the 
editors of the Northwestern University Law Review.  
1
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 5–6, 63, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 
(2009) (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 4892845 (link).  In Van Orden v. Perry, a majority of the Court had 
upheld the display of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol that 
had been donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (link).  Jus-
tice Breyer cast the deciding vote, eschewing a ―single mechanical formula,‖ and instead relying on the 
broader principle that the Establishment Clause was designed to avoid ―religiously based divisiveness.‖  
Id. at 699, 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  In his opinion, Breyer emphasized in particular 
that the lack of any prior challenges during the course of the monument‘s forty-year history: 
suggest[s] more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals, 
whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument as 
amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a 
particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion over nonreligion, to ‗en-
gage in‘ any ‗religious practice[e],‘ to ‗compel‘ any ‗religious practice[e],‘ or to 
‗work deterrence‘ of any ‗religious belief.‘ . . .  Those 40 years suggest that the 
public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tab-
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I. A GHOSTLY DIALOGUE 
A specter haunts Pleasant Grove City v. Summum2—the specter of re-
ligion.  Although both sides insistently litigated the case under the Free 
Speech Clause, the prospect of an Establishment Clause violation continual-
ly emerged during oral argument, slightly beyond the Supreme Court‘s pur-
view.  The written statements that the Court ultimately produced conjured a 
similar ghostly apparition located just outside the boundaries of the holding.  
Whereas Justice Alito‘s majority opinion simply determined that the display 
of the Ten Commandments monument constituted government speech, a 
circumstance that precluded the possibility of a free speech-based chal-
lenge, the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) 
and Souter again raised the Establishment Clause specter.3 
Anticipating the potential for further litigation that might emerge from 
what was left unsaid by Justice Alito‘s opinion, Justice Scalia hastened to 
reassure Pleasant Grove City that the decision in the case had not ―pro-
pelled it from the Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establishment 
Clause fire.‖4  To Scalia, although the ―shadow‖ of the Establishment 
Clause may have hung over the proceedings, the light cast by the precedent 
of Van Orden v. Perry,5 which involved a Ten Commandments display 
nearly identical to the one in Summum, should exorcise it.6  In 1961, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles donated a Ten Commandments monument to 
Texas that was subsequently displayed on the grounds of the state capitol.7  
In 1971, continuing to pursue the goal of reducing juvenile delinquency, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles furnished Pleasant Grove with a nearly identical 
Ten Commandments monument.8  When confronted with an Establishment 
Clause challenge against the Texas arrangement in Van Orden, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
lets‘ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective 
of a cultural heritage. 
Id. at 702–03. 
2
  129 S. Ct. 1125 (link). 
3
  Compare Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 49 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf (noting that 
―[f]]orms of the word ‗religion‘ appear only five times in the majority opinion‖) (link), with Summum, 
129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―[F]rom the start, the case has been litigated in the sha-
dow of the First Amendment‘s Establishment Clause: the city wary of associating itself too closely with 
the Ten Commandments monument displayed in the park, lest that be deemed a breach in the so-called 
wall of separation between church and State . . . .‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)), and id. at 1141–
42 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that ―there is no doubt that this case and its govern-
ment speech claim has been litigated by the parties with one eye on the Establishment Clause‖). 
4
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
5
  545 U.S. 677 (plurality opinion).  See also supra note 1. 
6
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
7
  Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003) (link). 
8
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129 (majority opinion); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 6 
(counsel for Petitioner Pleasant Grove City Jay Sekulow commenting that ―[t]his monument is very sim-
ilar to what was in play in Van Orden‖). 
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narrowly rejected it.9  With seemingly straightforward reasoning, and em-
phasizing that ―[n]othing in [Van Orden] suggested that the outcome turned 
on a finding that the monument was only ‗private‘ speech,‖ Justice Scalia 
concluded that the decision in Van Orden would preclude any finding that 
Pleasant Grove had violated the Establishment Clause.10 
By contrast, Justice Souter‘s concurrence suggested that the Establish-
ment Clause might continue to haunt analogous cases involving government 
speech.  As he maintained: ―It is simply unclear how the relatively new cat-
egory of government speech will relate to the more traditional categories of 
Establishment Clause analysis . . . .‖11  His resolution of this lack of clarity 
would entail applying a ―reasonable observer‖ test similar to that employed 
under the Establishment Clause.12  Under this analysis, he would ―ask 
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the ex-
pression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the gov-
ernment chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on 
public land.‖13  Although Justice Souter refrained from mentioning Van Or-
den in his concurrence, the reasonable observer test could serve to distin-
guish the Texas and Pleasant Grove contexts for both Free Speech and 
Establishment Clause purposes.  If the surroundings or placement of the 
Ten Commandments monuments diverged sufficiently in the two cases, the 
determination as to whether they constituted government speech or gov-
ernment endorsement of religion might also differ. 
On Justice Souter‘s view, a successful Establishment Clause challenge 





  545 U.S. 677 (deciding five to four in favor of the state). 
10
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
11
  Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring). 
12
  In the Establishment Clause arena, the ―reasonable observer‖ or ―objective observer‖ inquiry de-
veloped out of Justice O‘Connor‘s emphasis on government endorsement of religion.  As Kent Green-
awalt has explained: 
Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test figured prominently in the last two decades.  
One reason is that O‘Connor has been the crucial swing vote in many cases under 
the Establishment Clause and she has reviewed most of them in terms of en-
dorsement.  
. . .  
The relevant issue . . . [is] whether an objective observer, ―acquainted with the 
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes and with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the statute, would perceive a law as a state endorse-
ment‖ of religion. 
. . . 
Justice O‘Connor made clear that she thought that judges should imagine an ob-
jective observer, not attached to any religious group.  This objective observer is 
familiar not only with a law‘s text, legislative history, and implementation, but al-
so with free exercise values (and presumably other relevant constitutional values). 
2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 87, 80, 
183 (2008) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67–84 (1985) (O‘Connor, J., concurring)) (link). 
13
  Id. 
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those presented in Summum.  What lies behind the apparent disagreement 
between Justices Scalia and Souter?  Does Justice Souter‘s account of the 
requirements of the Establishment Clause contrast with that of Scalia simp-
ly because the former was, as he himself observed in oral argument, ―a Van 
Orden dissenter,‖14 or does a further quandary about the implications of Van 
Orden emanate from the margins of the Summum case?  The remainder of 
this Essay contends that taking Justice Souter‘s concurrence in Summum se-
riously points to the possible limitations of the norms of equality and neu-
trality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that have been both suggested 
by a number of the Court‘s recent cases and endorsed to varying extents by 
scholars.15  These limitations come to the fore when, as in the Summum 
case, the government is permitted to engage in some seemingly religious 
displays or exercises—whether because of their venerable history, their mi-
nimally religious character, the secular context in which they are placed, or 
for some other reason16—but simultaneously resist the inclusion of certain 
religions within those displays or exercises.  An emphasis on equality under 
the Establishment Clause would suggest that the Court should not permit 
this governmental strategy.  If, however, the Court were to mandate that the 
government sponsor the displays and exercises of all religions equally, this 
decision might undermine a number of the justifications under the Estab-
lishment Clause for permitting the government to engage in such de mini-
mis religious activities in the first place.  In either case, an incompatibility 
emerges between several lines of Establishment Clause reasoning.  
II. AN UNTIMELY DEMISE 
Among the other mysteries the Summum case poses is one that seems 
to have perplexed even the Justices during oral argument—the puzzle of 
why any Establishment Clause claim died off before being presented to the 
Court.  The technical explanation is relatively straightforward; although the 
Summum complaint initially included appeals to the establishment provi-
sions of the Utah Constitution,17 the group did not continue to press its state-





  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 63. 
15
  See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
16
  For some examples of these rationales, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (citing 
the ―unique history‖ of legislative prayer, which suggested its coexistence with nonestablishment, to 
uphold the practice in Nebraska) (link); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-86 (1984) (determining 
that the display of a crèche, when surrounded by other icons of the ―Christmas Holiday season,‖ was 
permitted by the Establishment Clause) (link); GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 92 (observing that one 
mode of reconciling government invocation of religion with the Establishment Clause ―emphasizes the 
minor significance of [the] various practices.  Yes, they have religious content, but it does not figure im-
portantly in anyone‘s life.  Perhaps a kind of de minimis approach should treat practices as tolerable if 
they involve no serious impairment of appropriate church-state relations.‖). 
17
  See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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and the Tenth Circuit therefore deemed this challenge waived.18  Slightly 
murkier is the reason for Summum‘s reliance on state rather than federal re-
ligious liberty protections.  Prior Tenth Circuit cases shifting arguments 
similar to Summum‘s from the domain of religious establishment into that 
of free speech provide part of the rationale; the precedent furnished by the 
Supreme Court in Van Orden v. Perry supplies another.19  A third, deeper 
explanation may also arise from the difficulty of formulating an Establish-
ment Clause-based argument that would encourage a court to grant Sum-
mum the capacity to erect its own display in Pleasant Grove‘s Pioneer Park, 
rather than simply to dictate removal of the monument donated by the Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles.20 
A brief examination of Utah‘s religious liberty jurisprudence suggests 
some compelling arguments for Summum‘s position.  In its complaint, 
Summum contended that Pleasant Grove‘s ―refusal . . . to allow the reli-
gious monument of SUMMUM on the lawn of the City Park while allowing 
the display of the Eagles‘ religious monument . . . [and] while providing a 
forum to the Eagles for the display of a religious monument violates the Es-
tablishment provision of the Utah Constitution.‖21  The parts of the Utah 
Constitution treating the establishment of religion are somewhat more de-
tailed than those of the U.S. Constitution.  The former does echo the latter‘s 
language regarding establishment.22  In addition, however, the Utah Consti-
tution specifies that ―[t]here shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall 
any church dominate the State or interfere with its functions.  No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious wor-






  See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1048 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (link), rev’d sub 
nom. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
19
  See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
20
  In his contribution to this Symposium, Nelson Tebbe discusses a similar quandary raised by Sala-
zar v. Buono, involving the transfer of the land housing a white cross from the government to the Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars.  As he explains, the constitutional difficulty and corresponding remedy are quite 
different if one construes the challengers as seeking equal treatment of their religious symbols instead of 
elimination of the cross itself.  See Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (link); Buono 
v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (link), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 
1313 (2009). 
21
  Joint Appendix at 20, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2415597.  
22
  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (link); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (link); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4 (link).  
See also Soc‘y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993) (―[P]ortions of ar-
ticle I, section 4 were drawn directly from outside sources, [but] certain aspects of the provision are 
unique to Utah.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
23
  UTAH CONST. art I, § 4. 
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In Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,24 the Utah Supreme 
Court analyzed this language in the context of legislative prayer.  Rejecting 
a challenge to the Salt Lake City council‘s practice of opening its sessions 
with a religious invocation, the court determined that, although the prayer 
constituted a ―religious exercise‖ within the meaning of the state constitu-
tion, it did not violate the state constitution‘s restriction on the appropria-
tion of public money.25  Nor did the activity foster a ―union of Church and 
State‖ of a variety that would run afoul of the state constitution‘s prohibi-
tion.26 
Rather than interpreting the relevant sections of the Utah Constitution 
according to their plain meaning, as the Society of Separationists itself had 
urged, the Utah Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the his-
torical events leading to the constitution‘s adoption in 1895 and of details 
concerning the document‘s framing.27  In doing so, the court rehearsed the 
events surrounding the Mormon settlement of the territory, the heated dis-
putes with the federal government concerning polygamy, and the growing 
division in the late nineteenth-century between Mormons and members of 
other religious groups as well as those who had been excommunicated from 
the Mormon church. 
From this history, the court derived a conclusion about the fundamental 
principles bolstering the constitutional protections for religious liberty.  It 
determined that the ―dominant theme[s] . . . underl[ying] the various provi-
sions on freedom of religion and conscience‖ consist of: ―(i) a distancing of 
government from involvement with religion, (ii) nonsectarianism to the ex-
tent there is government involvement with religion, and (iii) government 
neutrality—the maintenance of a level playing field in civil matters—as be-
tween religious and nonreligious sentiments.‖28  While emphasizing equali-
ty, both among religious sects, and between religion and non-religion, these 
principles do not, as the court explained, entail an estrangement between 
church and state.29 
As a result, religions in Utah can receive government resources so long 





  870 P.2d 916. 
25
  Id. at 938–39. 
26
  Id. at 939–40. 
27
  Id. at 921–29, 935–36, 939–40. 
28
  Id. at 934, 936.  The second and third of these principles might be thought to map roughly onto 
what Chris Eisgruber and Larry Sager have termed the ―antidiscrimination‖ and ―neutrality‖ principles 
of their conception of ―equal liberty.‖  See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 52–53 (2007) (link). 
29
  Soc’y of Separationists, Inc., 870 P.2d at 939 (disagreeing ―with the Separationists that the fra-
mers of the Utah Constitution intended a complete separation between religion and the state,‖ and hold-
ing that ―the union-of-church-and-state ban applies only to circumstances that join a particular religious 
denomination and the state so that the two function in tandem on an ongoing basis‖).  The implicit 
avoidance of the ―wall of separation‖ model here is also reminiscent of Eisgruber and Sager.  See 
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 28, at 22–24. 
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Supreme Court appears to have conflated.  According to the court, ―[w]hen 
the state is neutral, any benefit flowing to religious worship, exercise, or in-
struction can be fairly characterized as indirect because the benefit flows to 
all those who are beneficiaries of the use of government money or property, 
which may include, but is not limited to, those engaged in religious wor-
ship, exercise, or instruction.‖30  The court therefore ―read [a] neutrality re-
quirement into the ‗no public money or property‘ language of article I, 
section 4,‖31 and held that two elements of neutrality were crucial to the 
constitutionality of a challenged government act: ―[f]irst, the money or 
property must be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis‖; and ―[s]econd, 
the public money or property must be equally accessible to all.‖32  The 
prayer opening city council meetings violated neither of these prohibitions. 
A city council‘s refusal to allow a different kind of prayer did, howev-
er, contravene them.  While the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Salt Lake 
City council‘s practice of engaging in prayer in Society of Separationists, in 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp. it deemed the Murray city council‘s rejection 
of a proposed alternative prayer to be a violation of the neutrality require-
ment.33  The Murray city council solicited and accepted prayers produced by 
disparate religious denominations, including Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, 
and Native American, but it claimed that the prayer language Snyder sug-
gested fell outside the guidelines for opening invocations.34  The prayer im-
plored the female deity to whom it appealed: ―We fervently ask that you 
guide the leaders of this city, Salt Lake County and the state of Utah so that 
they may see the wisdom of separating church and state and so that they 
will never again perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official 
government functions . . . .‖35  Despite challenging the premise of the neu-
trality approach to religious liberty, this invocation should have been ac-
cepted, according to the Utah Supreme Court, if Murray City were selecting 
the council‘s opening prayers on a nondiscriminatory basis.36  The court 
presented two alternative remedies for the city council‘s violation of Utah‘s 
establishment provisions.  On the one hand, it suggested that the employ-
ment of discriminatory selection criteria invalidated the entire practice and, 
on the other hand, it indicated that the individual seeking to present his 





  Soc’y of Separationists, Inc., 870 P.2d at 937. 
31
  Id. at 938. 
32
  Id.  
33
  Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325, 331–32 (Utah 2003) (link). 
34
  See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228–30 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (link). 
35
  Snyder, 73 P.3d at 327 n.1. 
36
  Id. at 331. 
37
  Compare Snyder, 73 P.3d at 331–32 (―Because Murray City‘s means of selecting those entitled to 
offer the prayer at the opening of its city council meetings was not nondiscriminatory, and therefore not 
neutral, the city‘s practice of opening its meetings with prayer constitutes a direct benefit to the exercise 
of religion and violates article I, section 4‘s prohibition that ‗[n]o public money or property shall be ap-
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It is worth emphasizing the relationship between the constitutionality 
determinations in Society of Separationists and Snyder.  Whereas a particu-
lar mode of state support for religion—permitting legislative prayer—might 
in isolation be deemed constitutional (as it was in Society of Separationists), 
that same mode of state support could become unconstitutional once a new 
set of circumstances arises (as it did in Snyder).  In the absence of conspi-
cuous evidence that proposals for prayer were being rejected, the practice 
involved in Society of Separationists was upheld; once a third-party‘s at-
tempt to intervene and furnish his or her version of religious exercise was 
denied, however, that event rendered the continuation of the prior practice 
unconstitutional. 
From this perspective, it becomes evident why Summum included an 
appeal to the Utah Constitution‘s establishment provisions and their inter-
pretation by the Utah Supreme Court in its original complaint.  Even if the 
Ten Commandments monument could legitimately be situated in Pioneer 
Park without raising concern about the potential establishment of religion, 
Pleasant Grove‘s refusal to accept an alternative religious monument might 
make the original display itself unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, for un-
known reasons, Summum failed to press these state-law claims on its ap-
peal to the Tenth Circuit. 
Turning to Summum‘s federal claims, a variety of Tenth Circuit opi-
nions suggest the rationale behind Summum‘s neglect of the federal Estab-
lishment Clause.  Whereas the Tenth Circuit, in an en banc decision also 
labeled Snyder v. Murray City Corp.,38 had foreclosed the possibility that it 
would interpret the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution in the 
manner that the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the religious liberty provi-
sions of the Utah Constitution, it shifted several challenges to Ten Com-
mandments displays from the register of religion to that of speech.  Both the 
initial panel decision in Snyder v. Murray City Corp.39 and the full circuit‘s 
reconsideration of the case relied on the Supreme Court‘s determination in 
Marsh v. Chambers,40 which upheld the Nebraska legislature‘s practice of 
opening sessions with a prayer by a publicly funded chaplain.  The analysis 
performed by Judge Ebel, the author of the en banc majority opinion in 
Snyder, was particularly suggestive.  According to Ebel, the Supreme Court 
had treated ―the constitutionality of legislative prayers‖ as a ―sui generis le-
gal question,‖ and deemed such legislative prayers ―a kind of religious ge-
nre‖ whose compatibility with the Establishment Clause was demonstrated 
                                                                                                                           
propriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction . . . .‘‖), with id. at 332 (―If 
Murray City chooses to continue to open its city council meetings with prayer, it must strictly adhere to 
the neutrality requirements set forth herein and in Society of Separationists.  Under those neutrality re-
quirements, Snyder should be allowed to offer his prayer.‖). 
38
  159 F.3d 1227. 
39
  124 F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997) (link), rev’d 159 F.3d 1227. 
40
  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
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by its historical roots.41  Legislative prayer might fall outside the genre pro-
tected by Marsh only if it entailed, on the one hand, ―proselytiz[ing] a par-
ticular religious tenet or belief‖ or ―aggressively advocat[ing] a specific 
religious creed,‖ or, on the other hand, ―select[ing] the person who is to re-
cite the legislative body‘s invocational prayer‖ with an impermissible mo-
tive.42  Neither of these concerns, the court determined, was raised by the 
facts in Snyder.43 
Judge Lucero‘s concurring opinion emphasized an additional aspect of 
the Marsh decision: that the genre of legislative prayer constitutes a form of 
governmental speech.  According to Lucero, ―the opinion‘s historical treat-
ment of legislative prayer shows that Marsh involves, and should be limited 
to, established chaplaincies—chaplaincies that are so structured that they 
become an arm or an office of the legislature.‖44  For this reason, Lucero 
would have rejected not only Snyder‘s claim, but also the very form of 
prayer encouraged by the Murray city council, because the selection of pri-
vate speakers to publicly pronounce religious views would encourage im-
permissible proselytizing.  As he explained: 
 
Under the foregoing analysis, government would have to 





  Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1232–33.  History has been invoked in a number of different ways to suggest 
the compatibility of various kinds of government activities with the Establishment Clause.  Kent Green-
awalt has summarized three principal approaches: 
One reliance on history is to conclude that if the very practice that is challenged 
was accepted without controversy at the founding, that counts powerfully against 
a conclusion that the practice is unconstitutional. . . .  A broader reliance builds 
analogies from historically accepted practices. . . .  A third use of history encou-
rages more flexible constitutional development.  One looks to the basic evils non-
establishment was meant to correct and asks whether the challenged practice 
presents some of those evils. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 192.  The treatment of legislative prayer generally falls into the first 
of these categories.  See id.   
History‘s role in the Van Orden decision, although crucial, is slightly more difficult to categorize.  
Justice Rehnquist‘s plurality opinion invokes the ―unbroken history of official acknowledgement by all 
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789,‖ enumerates 
several other long-standing displays of the Ten Commandments, and suggests that ―[o]ur opinions, like 
our building, have recognized the role the Decalogue plays in America‘s heritage.‖  Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677, 686, 689 (2005) (plurality opinion) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).  Unlike the Marsh Court, the Van Orden plurality does not appeal to the 
presence of the precise practice in question at the time of the Founding, but instead contends that the go-
vernmental acknowledgment of religion since that moment and the number of decades-old Ten Com-
mandments displays should together provide a historical justification for the Texas monument.  In 
addition, Rehnquist associates the Ten Commandments with America‘s cultural heritage rather than ex-
clusively with a religious message.  For Breyer, in concurrence, the history of the monument‘s accep-
tance over forty years renders it more secular than religious.  See supra note 1. 
42
  Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234. 
43
  Id. at 1235. 
44
  Id. at 1237 (Lucero, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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islative prayer.  It may appear ironic that the Establishment 
Clause should endorse official chaplaincies, while proscrib-
ing a practice of inviting prayer volunteers who may 
represent many and varied religious faiths.  But though this 
effect may appear establishmentarian, a closer inspection 
proves otherwise.  In fact, the strength and diversity of reli-
gious life is doubly benefitted by a legislative retreat to 
Marsh.45 
 
Counter-intuitively, the state must maintain the historically established 
genre of legislative prayer as governmental, rather than succumbing to the 
temptation to transform it into a forum for private speakers furnishing dis-
parate invocations.  On this account, the very existence of governmental 
control helps to limit the extent to which the prayer may proselytize or en-
dorse one religion over another.  Hence the fact that the government itself is 
speaking renders certain forms of legislative prayer less subject to Estab-
lishment Clause challenge than those forms of legislative prayer that simply 
furnish an opportunity, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for individuals to 
speak. 
Although the Tenth Circuit rejected the possibility of an equality-based 
Establishment Clause challenge in Snyder, it shifted its equality analysis to 
the free speech arena in several cases involving Ten Commandments mo-
numents.  After the 1973 case Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,46 in which 
the Tenth Circuit held that a Ten Commandments monument donated by the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles could withstand Establishment Clause challenge 
because it was ―primarily secular, and not religious in character,‖ and ―nei-
ther its purpose or effect tends to establish religious belief,‖47 both lower 
courts and litigants have avoided treading the Establishment Clause path.48  
Instead, in Summum v. Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit opined that the pres-
ence of a Ten Commandments monument on a courthouse lawn had pro-
duced a limited public forum from which Summum‘s speech could not be 





  Id. at 1243.   
46
  475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) (link), superceded by Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677.  See Soc‘y of Sepa-
rationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2005). 
47
  Anderson, 475 F.2d at 34. 
48
  See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 999–1000, 1000 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (link) (elabo-
rating that, ―[a]t oral argument, Summum‘s counsel conceded that, absent en banc reconsideration of 
[Anderson], this panel could not reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment, in favor of the 
City of Ogden, on Summum‘s Establishment Clause claim,‖ although also opining that ―Summum‘s 
concession may have been unwise‖ and that ―the Establishment Clause issue is certainly not so 
straightforward as the City would presume‖); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 
1997) (link) (explaining that the district court had dismissed Summum‘s Establishment Clause-based 
challenge to Salt Lake County‘s refusal to allow the organization to place its monolith on the lawn of the 
courthouse despite the presence on that lawn of a Ten Commandments monument). 
49
  Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919. 
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determined that the City of Ogden had impermissibly discriminated against 
Summum‘s viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.50  Despite eschewing an antidiscrimination framework in the 
Establishment Clause context, the Tenth Circuit advanced such an approach 
to the same kinds of cases through appealing to freedom of expression prin-
ciples instead.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Van Orden 
had placed the final nail in the coffin for Establishment Clause-based chal-
lenges to Ten Commandments monuments,51 thereby channeling such liti-
gants into Free Speech Clause claims instead. 
The contrast between the Utah Supreme Court‘s and the Tenth Cir-
cuit‘s treatments of legislative prayer suggests a clash between two logics.  
As the Utah Supreme Court‘s decisions demonstrate, following a strict anti-
discrimination norm would lead to requiring that the government either al-
low all forms of legislative prayer or that it desist from the practice entirely.  
As Judge Lucero‘s concurrence in Snyder v. Murray City Corp. indicates, 
however, long-standing Establishment Clause principles, like the restriction 
against government endorsement of religion or proselytizing, might 
mandate against opening a government forum to all kinds of religious 
speech.  As the following section argues, Justice Souter‘s opinion in Sum-
mum points to the persistence of this clash in the context of Ten Com-
mandments monuments. 
III. THE SPECTER RAISED 
A close examination of Justice Souter‘s concurrence in Summum 
serves to foreground a fundamental contradiction between, on the one hand, 
both the decision in Van Orden and the Court‘s developing position on 
government speech, and, on the other, the Court‘s general move in the di-
rection of equality-based reasoning in the religious liberty arena.  Although 
the rhetoric of Justice Breyer‘s concurrence in Van Orden resonated with 
the goal of eliminating divisive debates over religion,52 taking that case to-
gether with Summum demonstrates the potential for inter-denominational 
conflict that the Court‘s jurisprudence has generated.  Unless the Court 





  City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1000. 
51
  In 2005, the Tenth Circuit remanded another lawsuit challenging the Ten Commandments display 
on Establishment Clause grounds in light of Van Orden, and the suit was eventually voluntarily dis-
missed.  See Lund, supra note 3 (discussing the procedural history of this case); Soc’y of Separationists,, 
416 F.3d 1239; Order Granting Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a),  
Soc‘y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:03-CV-839 BSJ (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2006). 
52
  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703–04 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (―[A]s I have said, in reaching the conclusion that the Texas display falls on the permissi-
ble side of the constitutional line, I rely less on a literal application of any particular test than upon con-
sideration of the basic purposes of the First Amendment‘s Religion Clauses themselves.  This display 
has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations.  That experience helps us understand that 
as a practical matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive.‖). 
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the facts in Summum that partakes of an anti-discrimination rationale, it will 
move increasingly toward affirming a Judeo-Christian American heritage 
and allowing for the exclusion of other religious traditions from govern-
ment displays.  At the same time, if the Court does indicate in a future case 
that the government must not prefer the monuments of one religion over 
those of another, it may increase the likelihood that the state will be seen as 
impermissibly endorsing religion, which could vitiate the historical and 
other rationales given for permitting activities like legislative prayer or Ten 
Commandments displays under the Establishment Clause.53 
A number of scholars, including, most prominently, Chris Eisgruber 
and Larry Sager, have espoused equality-based approaches to adjudication 
under the religion clauses—though the underlying conception of equality 
endorsed differs significantly among its advocates.54  Furthermore, the 
Court itself has been moving in the direction of an equality norm in its Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.55  For example, in Zel-
man v. Simmons-Harris56 the Court upheld a program that allowed public 
support for religious schools because the voucher model at issue permitted 
private individuals to determine where to allocate governmental resources 
and did not discriminate between religion and non-religion or on the basis 
of particular religious affiliations.57 
As Justice Souter‘s concurrence in Summum illuminates, however, the 
equality emphasis in the Establishment Clause context may interact oddly 
with the emerging doctrine concerning government speech.  According to 
Souter: 
 
After today‘s decision, whenever a government maintains a 
monument it will presumably be understood to be engaging 
in government speech.  If the monument has some religious 
character, the specter of violating the Establishment Clause 
will behoove it to take care to avoid the appearance of a 
flat-out establishment of religion, in the sense of the gov-





  For a discussion of these rationales, see supra notes 16 & 41 and accompanying text. 
54
  See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA‘S TRADITION OF 
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008) (link); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 28; Bernadette Meyler, The Lim-
its of Group Rights: Religious Institutions and Religious Minorities in International Law, 22 ST. JOHN‘S 
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 553–58 (2007) [hereinafter Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights] (link); Ber-
nadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History, 47 B.C. L. 
REV. 275 (2006) [hereinafter Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise] (link); Robin Charlow, 
The Elusive Meaning of Religious Equality, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1529 (2005) (link) (elaborating upon the 
obstacles to formulating a unified account of equality in the religious liberty context). 
55
  See Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights, supra note 54, at 553–58; Meyler, The Equal Protection 
of Free Exercise, supra note 54, at 278–80. 
56
  536 U.S. 639 (2002) (link). 
57
  Id. at 653 (emphasizing that the voucher scheme involved a ―program of true private choice‖ and 
was neutral toward religion).  See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 28, at 38, 198–239. 
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In such an instance, there will be safety in numbers, and it 
will be in the interest of a careful government to accept 
other monuments to stand nearby, to dilute the appearance 
of adopting whatever particular religious position the single 
example alone might stand for.  As mementoes and testi-
monials pile up, however, the chatter may well make it less 
intuitively obvious that the government is speaking in its 
own right simply by maintaining the monuments.58 
 
In earlier cases involving potentially suspect displays, like Lynch v. 
Donnelly59 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,60 the Court had insisted that 
public presentation of even an iconic object, like a crèche, could be more a 
manifestation of tradition than an endorsement of religion if surrounded by 
items with secular significance, and that the inclusion of a Christmas tree 
with a menorah tended to minimize the religious import of the latter rather 
than serving to endorse both Christianity and Judaism.61  Souter‘s sugges-
tion thus implies that the state may not only try to inoculate itself against at-
tack by placing symbols that might otherwise be construed as religious in 
contexts that serve to displace that significance, but also by multiplying the 
number of religions invoked in order to demonstrate that it has not preferred 
one sect over another.  Although this latter mode of inoculation is not one 
suggested directly by the cases involving religious displays, it is consistent 
with other areas of the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.62 
As Souter accurately observes, however, given the outcome in Sum-
mum, a governmental entity may, counter-intuitively, face less fear of con-





  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141–42 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
59
  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
60
  492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link). 
61
  Id. at 598–602 (analyzing the problematic nature of the display of a crèche while ultimately 
upholding the display as constitutional); id. at 613–21 (explaining that the juxtaposition of a Christmas 
tree with a menorah suggested a general celebration of two cultural holidays rather than a ―simultaneous 
endorsement‖ of Judaism and Christianity); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (elaborating that the city‘s exhibit 
―comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas, including, 
among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa‘s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christ-
mas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, 
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads ―SEASONS GREETINGS,‖ and the crèche at issue 
here‖); id. at 691 (O‘Connor, J. concurring) (―The evident purpose of including the crèche in the larger 
display was not promotion of the religious content of the crèche but celebration of the public holiday 
through its traditional symbols.  Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance even if 
they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose.‖). 
62
  See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (link) (striking down a Minnesota statute that 
imposed registration and reporting requirements on certain religious groups but not others and explain-
ing that ―[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot 
be officially preferred over another‖). 
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or another relic of the Judeo-Christian tradition than if it provides a more 
ecumenical set of religious icons.  If the government appeared to be furnish-
ing a forum for the expression of private religious views, it would not be 
permitted to discriminate among them; by contrast, when speaking on its 
own behalf, the government could contend that it is allowed to prioritize 
some religions over others.  As Souter explained: 
 
[T]he government could well argue, as a development of 
government speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own 
views, it is free of the Establishment Clause‘s stricture 
against discriminating among religious sects or groups.  
Under this view of the relationship between the two doc-
trines, it would be easy for a government to favor some pri-
vate religious speakers over others by its choice of 
monuments to accept.63 
 
The historicity of a monument that has been in place for decades 
might, like the historical legacy of legislative prayer, be thought to protect a 
government against Establishment Clause challenges.  This result would, 
however, render the government speech cases incompatible with the anti-
discrimination principle that has characterized much of the Court‘s recent 
religious liberty jurisprudence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite Justice Scalia‘s effort in Summum to exorcise the spirit of the 
Establishment Clause,64 its specter may continue to haunt the Court in simi-
lar cases.  Even if Van Orden itself was correctly decided, the presence of 
another religious group demanding equal treatment legally differentiates the 
facts in Summum from those present in the earlier case.  If the U.S. Supreme 
Court were to follow the model set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
context of legislative prayer, it would permit the Ten Commandments mo-
nument to remain in Van Orden, but either order the monument‘s removal 
or the inclusion of the other religion‘s display when faced with an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge in a case similar to Summum.  Were this to occur, 
however, the historical reasoning underpinning the outcome in Marsh—or 
even in Van Orden itself—would be undermined.  Fully following the path 
of religious equality when the government is speaking could thereby lead to 
an apparent governmental endorsement of religion.  Although Souter‘s re-
tirement from the Court will remove him from further consideration of 
these issues, the questions that he raised in his Summum concurrence will 





  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).   
64
  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
